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ARISTOTLE ON THE NATURE OF LOGOS
©John P. Anton
Department of Philosophy
University of South Florida
Tampa, Florida
I. Synopsis
Attention has been frequently drawn to the problems attending attempts "to trace a long progression of
meanings in the history of the word logos" (Kerferd). Especially difficult proved the assigning to Aristotle a
place in this long progression. One of the reasons is that we have yet to reconstruct his theory of logos. The
difficulty is not so much with the complexity of the uses of the term in his works as it is with the widely
recognized fact that he left no special treatise on the subject of a doctrine of logos, not to be confused with
the instrumentalities found in the so-called logical works that comprise the Organon. The doctrine is not to
be found in the Metaphysics any more than it is treated in the biological works. Yet it exists, presumably with
the pieces dispersed in the various texts, waiting for the investigators to find and fit the parts into a coherent
whole. So far no such systematic opus has been produced, despite the number of interpretive attempts made
in recent times to identify what may conceivably count for a doctrine of logos. The importance of such a
doctrine or theory can hardly be denied, since it could, inter alia, provide the basis for a full explanation of
the intriguing connection between the two definitions of anthropos as logical and political animal. In pursuing
such a goal, certain interpreters found it tempting to reduce logos to language, broadly understood (Randall;
Mesthene, and Wedin).
The central issue this paper explores is the possibility of detecting a way, supported with what the texts
afford, to answer the question "What is logos", but do so not in the obvious sense of discussing the outcomes
of its operations, e.g. discourse, account, demonstration or definition, nor by stringing together textual
references to reconstruct the mechanics of articulating and communicating, but seeking to understand logos
qua ousia, though not as logos of an ousia. The paper sets forth the parameters for an inquiry in hope to
identify the components of this elusive doctrine.

X

II. The Problem of a Theory of logos.
An initial condition must be met to solve the problem regarding the building of a theory of logos, and it
consists of two parts: (a) to view logos as an exclusive activity of anthrôpos, and (b) to consider the differentia
indicating a property, named by the adjective ‘logikos’ as part of the "essence", the ti esti of anthrôpos. Since
this property cannot be subsumed under any genus of being, γένος τού δντος, other than that of ousia, the
possibility that logos be seen as a case of co-incidental being, συμβεβηκος öv, is excluded.1 If logos is neither
an ousia nor a case of a symbebëkos on what, then, is its identity?
I will begin with a fundamental Aristotelian position, that truth and falsity are things "being said",
statements referring to individual things. This is a relation between legomena and onta. When the statement
qua legomenon suits the fact, whatever it may be in each case, then the statement is true, and false when it
does not. Without this correlation between speech and what speech is about there can be no truth and hence
no knowledge.
The involvement of language in the pursuit of knowledge is everywhere in Aristotle’s works. Outside of
this involvement, neither truth nor knowledge can be referred to, except in some metaphorical way. The visual
arts, for instance, since they do not communicate orally, make statements only metaphorically; the ergon they
produce requires supplemental verbal work to report what is being conveyed, besides colors, lines, visual effects
in general. Even the poetic arts that depend on speech, dramatic, epic and lyric poetry, if truth is embodied
in them, it must be articulated, brought back in the guise of statements free of metaphor and emotional
tension. But the referential aspects of poetic works, as onta by technê, do not present a problem. With respect
to truth they involve the use language in the background rather than in the foreground. Nevertheless, the truth
they contain is a function of ascertainable references to onta.
The main question this paper will try to answer is "What is logos? What is its identity, how it is related
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to ousia, and why it is not a symbebëkos on? This is the major issue in Aristotle.2 The prevailing
interpretation is that logos is in some broad sense of the term "language". For example, Randall (1960),
followed by Mesthene (1964), have argued in favor of language, the source of which is nous poiëtikos, which
in turn generates logos. More recently, Wedin (1988) has concluded independently and more persuasively that
logos is essentially language as well as a faculty, the latter being distinct from nous and dianoia, yet intimately
connected to both. The issue Wedin left unanswered was the identity of the faculty involved and its precise
location as the source of logos? In this paper my remarks are limited to explaining an alternative answer in
the context of the following problem: how are the two differentiae, "logical" and "political", in the two
respective definitions of anthröpos (Pol. 1253a9-10: λόγον δε μόνον άνθρωπος εχει των ζφων, and 1252b30:
ό άνθρωπος φύσει ζωον πολιτικόν) interconnected.
Reconstructing Aristotle’s theory of logos calls for more than collecting and enumerating the diverse
functions of logos, such as sending signs, uttering warnings, exclaiming or refusing, exhibiting anger and threats,
or announcing pleasures and pains. All these uses, naturally enough, when verbal sounds are used, fall within
the domain of logos, but the problem of its identity cannot be solved through a theory of sound, grimace,
gesture, even language. Nor is logos the same of nous, conventionally translated as reason, despite certain
interconnected operations. Two pitfalls must be avoided here: (a) collapsing the faculties of nous and logos,
for by so doing neither the identity of logos nor the nature of language is properly revealed; and (b) translating
the expression ζωον λογικόν as "rational animal". The latter conceals a misleading rendition since it makes
logos interchangeable with "reason", in this case with nous. The two adjectives, ‘logical’ and ‘rational’, the one
Greek the other Latin, do not cover the same grounds technically speaking. The term ‘rational’, as Kerferd
has suggested, does not refer directly to logos and its diverse meanings.
The thesis I defend is that the concept of logos, no matter how many operations it covers, is not an
appendix of nous. I hope to show that logos is best understood in connection with the faculty Aristotle call
το κριτικόν (to kritikori). A special function of to kritikon includes the power to signify by means of articulate
sounds, logos, seen as the entelecheia of the kritikon, fashions and develops systems of signs, including the
comptes system of language, as its efficient and material tools, i.e. its communicative, including the audible,
media.
Another preliminary note must be added at this point. It concerns the intelligible aspects of things and
logos as dynamis and energeia. In one sense, all facts are "logical", but they are so only dynamei, i.e. their logical
aspects are in principle cognizable and formulable in discourse. But it takes human logos to articulate the
logical structures of the world and render them as knowledge. This is the logos, as the actuality of the kritikon
when it cooperates with the other powers of the soul.4 Briefly put, whereas things or onta do not have logos
qua energeia they do so qua dynamei', they are logical in that they are intelligible.
III. Reconstructing the theory
Given the philosophical importance of the doctrine of logos it is important not that we try to explore its
theoretical foundations, especially in view of the celebrated dictum that man is by nature a logical animal,
whereby logos is introduced as the differentiating feature of human life. Aristotle added to this definition
something else: "makers of things" that human beings are deliberate makers. If humans are logical by nature
and not by chance, they must possess such faculties or powers that make the features of being political and
being logical interrelated and coordinate. That humans know or cognize by nature is a plain enough fact. We
possess sense organs that enable us to discriminate one thing from another as needed for survival. The issue
then is not about sensing or knowing, leaving epistëmë aside for the moment, but knowing logically, i.e. in
accordance with logos. It is this issue that calls for looking into this peculiar activity by asking: What does it
mean to have logos and use it; briefly put, What is logos?5
All situations of communication enter the domain of logos but logos goes beyond the level of either sound,
grimace, gesture, even language. Still, logos is not the same as reason (nous) despite the overlapping of their
operations. Collapsing the two faculties does nothing to help reveal the nature either of language or logos.
Translating ζδοη logikon as "rational animal" makes logos interchangeable with reason. But these two
adjectives, logical and rational, do not cover the same territory. What would Aristotle have to say about this
facile interchange in the translations? One response would be to say that the term "rational" does not refer
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directly to logos and its diverse meanings, as Kerferd has suggested.6 What I am suggesting is that
conceptually, logos covers a set of operations connected with but still different from those of reason (nous).
In the sequel I will try to outline the differences, hoping that what I say might help remove a few cobwebs,
rather than add more to the existing ones.
III. Proposal for a solution
There is a long tradition that goes back to the beginnings of Greek philosophy and poetry that recognized
logos as a cosmic element and source of intelligibility, sometimes rivaling other archai, especially nous, for the
central position of the ultimate origin of order. Aristotle, it would seem, moved away from speculative and
mythical accounts opting for one that would accord with the facts and sustains confidence in their
intelligibility. In explaining relative praise and blame in case of minor deviations from mesotes, i.e. of certain
types of ethical judgments, Aristotle says that in these cases the judge does not err (λανθάνει), and adds:
ό δέ μέχρι τίνος και έπι πόσον ψεκτός ού ράδιον τώ λόγω άφορίσαι* ούδε γάρ άλλο ούδέν των
αισθητών· τα δε τοιαύτα έν τοις καθ’ εκαστα, και έν τή αισθήσει ή κρίσις. Nie. Eth. 1109b20-22
Yet to what degree and how much a man must be blamed is not easy to determine by definition. For
this is true of all sensible objects; regarding cases of degree in particular circumstances the judgment
(krisis) lies with sense-perception.
Αϊσθησις is called a σύμφυτος κριτική δυναμις, a natural faculty within aisthesis. This critical power
reaches beyond sensation, as we shall see. Yet, by being present in the operation of sensation, by being
activated along with sensation in the activity of the sensing of sensible objects, its work extends beyond what
the sense organ does. Aristotle speaks of the kritikon also in Post. Anal. 99b35, where he states that it is
present in all animals equipped with the power of sensing, but in the case of human beings, who retain the
effects of sensing as memories, which in turn are subject to the unifying process of nous, the kritikon becomes
the transmitting supplier of materials for knowledge (gnôsis) once the formation of universals is done. Hence,
we have a special and very important case of kritikon. As we shall see, th&kritikon is present in, or rather co
operating with, all the other faculties; to state this process differently, it is the same kritikon, pervasive and
common to all the other parts of the soul; indeed it has the same unity as the soul itself.
Each sense organ is in a neutral condition prior to its activation and in a state that lies between
contraries, i. e. the contraries as properties of the corresponding sensible objects. Their perceptible range of
properties, depending on the capability of the sense organ, is covered potentially. The actualization of the
power of the sense organ is one thing, the judgment related to every instance of perception, quite another.
The latter is the work of the kritikon in aisthesis. Instances of cold (psychron) and hot (thermon) are
experienced only as they differ from the neutral condition of our sense organs, i.e. as cases of excess and
deficiency (υπερβολή, έλλειψις): ώς τής αίσθήσεως Οιον μεσότης τίνος οΰσης τοις έν τοις αισθητής
έναντιώσεως (De An. 424a4). In the same work, and referring to Plato’s Timaeus, Aristotle uses the verb
hinein, to judge and to discriminate:
κρίνεται δε τα πράγματα τα μεν νω, τα δέ έπιστήμη τα δε δόξη, τα δ’ αισθήσει.
Things are judged, some by reason, others by knowledge, others again by opinion and others by
sensation. (Hicks tr.)
The important thing here is that hinein is done through a variety of agents, and hence it is a common
operation, or rather a co-operation used by nous, epistëme, doxa and aisthesis. Here is where the kritikon of
human beings is radically different from what it does in a limited way in other animals. The brief discussion
on the kritikon in De Anima Book II, where a slightly different list of powers of the soul is given, need not
detract from the account of kritikon. The list of powers is not used to introduce for the analysis of the
pervasive function of kritikon? To understand the operation of kritikon, we need certain distinctions
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introduced in De Anima II 4, where he says that the inquirer must ascertain what each faculty is, be it the
noëtikon, the aisthëtikon, or the threptikon. Here the noëükon replaces the dianoëtikon. And in De Anima III
2, 426b8-12, he declares that each sensation discriminates and judges: κρίνει:
έκαστη μεν ούν αϊσθησις του υποκειμένου αισθητού έστίν. ύπάρχουσα τω αίσθητηρίω ή αισθητήριον
και κρίνει τάς τού υποκειμένου αισθητού διαφοράς, οίον λευκόν μεν καί μέλαν δψις, γλυκύ δε καί
πικρόν γεΰσις. ομοίως δ’ έχει τούτο καί επί των άλλων.
Each sense is concerned with its own sensible object, being resident in the organ qua sense-organ,and
judges the specific differences of its own sensible object. Thus sight pronounces upon white and
black, taste upon sweet and bitter, and so with the rest (Hicks tr.)
This particular chapter is crucial.8 Aristotle uses the verb legein to mean "to identify and report"
differences in sensible qualities as between sweet in the case of taste, and white in that of vision, and to show
that they are cases that go beyond the differences encountered in the same sensation, as it is with different
colors. Here legein is used to identify and judge differences. He argues that hinein has to be one and the same
faculty in carrying out all instances of judging and for all sensible differences. Therefore, no separate sense
organ is needed for this pervasive operation. Judging is built into all sensation and all the other faculties. Thus
in De Anima III 2, 426M5-24:
ή καί δήλον δτι ή σαρξ ούκ εστι τδ έσχατον αισθητήριον* ανάγκη γάρ ήν άπτόμενον αυτού κρίνειν
το κρίνον, ούτε δη κεχωρισμένοις ενδέχεται κρίνειν δτι έτερον το γλυκύ τού λευκού, άλλα δει ένί
τινι άμφω δήλα είναι, ούτω μεν γάρ καν εί τού μεν εγώ τού δε σύ αϊσθοιο, δήλον αν εϊη δτι έτερα
άλλήλων. δει δε το εν λέγειν δτι έτερον έτερον γάρ το γλυκύ τού λευκού, λέγει άρα το αυτό, ώστε
ώς λέγει, ούτω καί νοεί καί αισθάνεται, ότι μεν ούν ούχ οίόν τε κεχωρισμένοις κρίνειν τα
κεχωρισμένα, δήλον. δτι δ’ ούδ’ εν κεχωρισμένφ χρόνω εντεύθεν.
Thus it is clear that the flesh is not the ultimate organ of sense; for, if it were, it would be necessary
that which judges should judge by contact with the sensible object. Nor indeed can we with separate
organs judge that sweet is different from white, but both objects must be clearly presented to some
single faculty. For, if we could, then the mere fact of my perceiving one thing and your perceiving
another would make it clear that the two things were different. But the single faculty is required to
pronounce them different, for sweet and white are [pronounced] different. It is one and the same
faculty, then, which so pronounces, so it also thinks and perceives. Clearly, then, it is not possible
with separate organs to pronounce judgment upon things that are separate: nor yet at separate times,
as the following considerations show. (Hicks tr.)9
The conclusion follows, stated in the form of a question:
άρ’ ούν άμα μεν καί αριθμώ αδιαίρετον καί άχώριστον το κρίνον, τφ είναι δε κεχωρισμένον;
(427a2-3)
Is, then, that which judges simultaneously in its judgment and numerically undivided and inseparable,
although separated logically? (Hicks tr.)
The answer that shapes up is that the krinon while logically divisible (diaireton), locally and numerically
is also indivisible (adiaireton); hence it is one, and it judges simultaneously. Insofar as it is divisible it is plural,
for it uses the same point at the same time twice. Such is the faculty of the krinon. And in De Anima III 3,
Aristotle refers to two different characteristics which par excellence define the soul: (a) movement from place
to place and (b) noein (thinking), hinein (judging), and aisthanesthai (sensing). He writes:
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δοκει δέ και το νοείν και το φρονειν ώσπερ αίσθάνεσθαί τι είναι (έν άμφοτέροις γαρ τούτοις
κρίνει τι ή ψυχή και γνωρίζει των δντων). (427al9-21)
Both thought and intelligence are commonly regarded as a kind of perception, since the soul in both
of these judges and recognizes something existent. (Hicks tr.)
However, that a judgment may occur as a product of an activity, cannot come about unless the elements
of which it is composed are brought together as a combination of thought units, noëmata. And it is this
combination of noëmata that constitutes truth and falsity. Another way of putting it, as it is said in the
Organon, truth and falsity are properties of statements, and statements are in fact symplokai noëmatôn, each
noëma communicated 2&phonë sëmantikë. In De Anima III 8 ,432a 11-12, we are told what phantasia does not
do; it does not perform any symplokë noëmatôn, and this deficiency is readily explained by what it is that
phantasia supplies: phantasmata, not noëmata. Here is where Aristotle should have re-introduced hinein, if
he wanted to formulate a theory of language. Actually he does provide the rudiments for such a logos, but only
in passing, in III 9, 432al5-19:
έπει δε ή ψυχή κατά δύο ώρισται δυνάμεις ή των ζώων, τφ τε κριτικφ, δ διανοίας εργον έστι και
αίσθήσεως, και ετι τφ κινειν τήν κατά τόπον κίνησιν, περί μεν αισθήσεως και νοΰ διωρίσθω
τοσαΰτα, περί δε τού κινοΰντος, τί ποτέ έστι τής ψυχής σκεπτέον.
The soul in animals has been defined in virtue of two faculties, not only by its capacity to judge,
which is the function of thought and perception, but also by the local movement which it imparts
to the animal. Assuming the nature of sensation and intellect to have been so far determined, we
have now to consider what it is in the soul which initiates motion. (Hicks tr.)
The capacity to judge, to notice, to record and to communicate differences, belongs to both sensing and
thinking, m tikos nous is not to be in any living body unless that body is equipped with the power of sensation.
Next we notice another crucial passage bearing on our theme; it occurs in De Motu Animalium 6 ,700bl7 sqq.:
όρώμεν δέ τα κινοΰντα το ζφον διάνοιαν και φαντασίαν και προαίρεσιν και βούλησιν και
έπιθυμίαν. ταύτα δέ πάντα άνάγεται εις νουν και δρεξιν. και γαρ ή φαντασία και ή αϊσθησις τήν
αυτήν έν τω νφ χώραν εχουσι* κριτικά γαρ πάντα, διαφέρουσι δε κατά τάς είρημένας έν άλλοις
διαφοράς.
Now we see that the things which move the animal are intellect, imagination, purpose, wish and
appetite. Now all these can be referred to mind and desire. For imagination and sensation cover the
same ground as the mind since they all exercise judgement though they differ in certain aspects as
has been defined elsewhere.10 (Forster tr.)
The key expression κριτικά γαρ πάντα is translated by Nussbaum (1978) "all are concerned with making
distinctions." It will not do to limit the kritikon to the mental operation of making distinctions, kritikon, as used
is this passage, does not explicitly refer to the function of detecting existing and discoverable differences in
the variety of symbebekota; the analysis of the genera of being has shown why the items collected under each
genus render each a pollachös legomenon.n
Nussbaum’s comment following the dismissal of associating kritika with judging is not relevant to the
present discussion; what stands out is what she understands to be her agreement with Cooper’s position,
although she cites only the conclusion of an argument. Assuming that she has correctly stated Cooper’s
position on the issue, the latter’s interpretation finds no support in Aristotle text. The claim Nussbaum puts
forth is excessive and draws from selected passages certain irrelevant conjectures, especially the ones that are
said to pertain to (a) reflective judgment and (b) verbal performance. In the first place, Aristotle is associating
the faculties to which he refers —a point Nussbaum fails to acknowledge—with the only animal that possesses
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them, Le., the human animal. Hence, it is misleading to bring into the discussion all living beings, especially
the ones that Aristotle credits with a limited degree of intelligence, as he does in the De Anima. Furthermore,
it is these complex discriminations in the co-operation of the faculties, generally of aisthesis, dianoia, and nous,
that constitute the content of cognitive verbal performances. This is precisely where language begins: in the
pervasive operations of the kritikon. It should be noted that the kritikon does not initiate the discriminations
it reports, nor does it create the contents it judges. However, its effectiveness is such that it alone of all the
faculties decides what constitutes the difference between fiction and reality.
IV. The kritikon as entelecheia
It would seem that the best way to settle the problem under consideration is to associate logos with
entelecheia. We may now make a preliminary exploration of a path already suggested. Perhaps we must
introduce the concept of entelecheia, for it is in this ontological connection we may identify the nature of logos
as both dynamis and energeia. But to defend this hypothesis would require that there be an analogous passing
of logos from first entelecheia to second entelecheia, i.e. to logos as it develops to nearing its own completion.
The process would reveal how logos makes itself known in action. Integral to this process is understanding the
intelligible features of the world, how its knowable aspects become "logical" or rather, if one prefers, how logos,
as the object of logos, becomes the content of human logos and includes itself in attaining completion.
A way to begin would be to say that logos is an arche, and be viewed as the other side of the coin,
whereby nous is the one and logos is the other, and say that the soul, in its capacity as nous, grasps the
principles and universale that logos uses and articulates. By making audible the principles that nous intuits,
logos informs experience by means of the requisite significant symbols for communication. It is logos that
enables communication to take on the shape of words, propositions and syllogisms. But logos does more than
that: it also enables the language it fashions to articulate the emotions and desires in naming and expressing
the states of the psyche. Even in this area of change and experience the kritikon arranges, discriminates further,
chooses and connects general concepts. Hence, whatever cannot fit the measure of logos is either chaotic or
self-contradictory, both being outside the power of aisthësis and nous, and hence forever excluded from the
realm of science, indeed from all significant discourse.
The principle of contradiction, a principle of logos, in control of all meaningful language, is true of all
discourse, of all propositional talking about things, of legomena haplôs and of onta, insofar are they are said
to be. The processes of onta although delimited within contraries are themselves not subjects of
contradictories. The latter are not principles of onta, for they occur as simultaneously paired propositions when
forcibly conjoined. Thus, as cognizing conjoins ta legomena to ta onta, the principle of non-contradiction
obtains, just as it does in the case of legomena as well as in that of the named things constructed by the technë
of discourse. The latter can be perfectly illustrated from the way onta occur in the world of poetry, which is
what makes the logos of poetry or poetry as logos significant and true.12
It is one thing to investigate language, quite another to investigate logos. This is so because language and
logos are not identical; it also explains why language can be inquired into, be a subject matter, but still it is
not logos. Logos about language and logos about logos are simply not the same activity, although both carry
the meaning of special inquiries. The former is feasible, the latter is not. Caution is advised at this point lest
we postulate a realm of the alogon, that which may be inferred as being outside or beyond logos, the non-logos,
the ontological alogon. Chance events are unrelated to what is alogon, i.e. what cannot be experienced and
explained; actually they are explainable but unpredictable; they happen incidentally.
V. Logos and the Polis
We may now return to the remark made early in this paper concerning the connection between the logikon
and the politikon. If the polis is prior by nature, so is logos. And if polis is for the sake of eudaimonia, hou
heneka, so is logos. Logos is teleological, just as are all the faculties of the soul, indeed the soul itself is. Logos
is inseparable from the meaning of the telos of human beings. Separating logos, in whole or in part, from the
telos that belongs to it or from the telos of the polis, is fatal to the pursuit of eudaimonia. Hence, treating logos
in abstraction, i.e. apart from the political context, or vice versa from the context of logos, leads to serious
errors. But when treating is done in the name of some analysis, all it can mean is that only a select aspect of
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logos or polis is actually being lifted from the total field and given prominence beyond its representative value.
In other words, the part is turned into the whole. When logos is understood as prior or arche, the coming into
being of polis is a necessary natural event. Seen thus, the polis is not to be understood as the outcome of social
contract.13
Can there be arete without logos! Since arete is hexis proairetike, the act of proairesis is indicative of logos
functioning as the detection of differences and the shaping of choices, thus providing a guide to the action;
it is present as deliberate action become habitual.14 Aristotle writes in Politics 1 1 ,1253a 30-36:
Φύσει μεν ή όρμή έν πάσιν έπι την τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν ό δε πρώτος συστήσας μεγίστων αγαθών
αίτιος· ώσπερ γαρ καί τελειωθεν βέλτιστον τών ζώων ό άνθρωπός έστιν, οΰτω καί χωρισθέν νόμου
καί δίκης χείριστον πάντων, χαλεπωτάτη γαρ αδικία εχουσα όπλα, ό δ’ άνθρωπος όπλα εχων
φύεται φρονήσει καί αρετή οίς επί τάναντία εστι χρήσθαι μάλιστα, διό άνοσιώτατον καί
άγριώτατον άνευ αρετής καί προς αφροδίσια καί έδωδήν χείριστον.
The impulse to form a partnership of this kind is present in all men by nature; but the man who first
united people in such partnership was the greatest of benefactors. For as man is the best of animals
when perfected, so he is the worst of all when sundered from law and right. For unrighteousness is
most pernicious when possessed of weapons, and man is born possessing weapons for the use of
wisdom and excellence, which it is possible to employ entirely for the opposite ends. Hence when
devoid of excellence man is the most unholy and savage of animals, and the worse in sexual
indulgence and in gluttony. (Rackham tr.)
Logos does not vanish even when seriously abused. It is still there but distorted, or rather it is
dysfunctioning. And so will the polis in which such dysfunctioning becomes acceptable social habit. The price
to be paid is suffering under deviant constitutions.
NOTES
1. That logos cannot be turned into an accidental on comes up in connection with the logos tës ousias of
anthröpos, whereby the ousia words are anthröpos, zöon, and the word logikon serves as the differentia. It would
be peculiar, to say the least, to call what the adjective logikon names an ousia since what it names belongs to
another ousia as the property that differentiates anthröpos from all other species of living things. Furthermore,
calling logikon an ousia would violate the stipulation that there cannot be an ousia of ousia, i.e. against the
case of on in Categories lb whereby ούτε έν ύποκειμένω έστί, ούτε καθ’ υποκειμένου λέγεται. The alternative
is to view logos in the context of what anthröpos is qua ousia.
2. This is an immense topic. The entry "logos” in the Oxford Classical Dictionary, devotes only two to three
sentences to Aristotle; the rest of the article goes on to discuss the uses of logos in religion. The absence of
a systematic treatment of logos in its rich and applied senses as well as contexts is difficult to explain. For
instance, there is very little in Hicks’ commentary on the De Anima, despite the exegetic comments on
individual passages where the term logos occurs. The same holds for Ross’s commentary on the same work.
I have found no single book that treats logos in the context of a comprehensive theory.
3. A close discussion of the merits of these positions is reserved for a longer version of this paper under
preparation for publication.
4. De anima, III 428a 1-5: εΐ δή εστιν ή φαντασία καθ’ ήν λέγομεν φάντασμά τι ή μ ίν γίγνεσθαι καί μή
ε ί τι κατά μεταφοράν λέγομεν, μία tís εστι τούτων δύναμι$ η έξις, καθ’ ην κρίνομεν κ α ί άληθεύομεν η
ψευδόμεθα. τοιαυται δ’ εισ ίν αϊσθησις, δόξα, επιστήμη, voi)s. "If imagination is the process by which we say
that an image is presented to us, and not anything which we call imagination metaphorically, it is one of the
faculties or states or habits by which we judge and speak truly or falsely." (Hett tr. Loeb, with changes).
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5. Since the listing of the passages referring to the operations of logos is not exhaustive it does not guide the
reader to look for those that pertain to a theory about logos. See Bonitz Index Aristotelicum, where the related
passages are listing under the following heads: word, language, or speech; thought; reasoning; mathematical
proportion, and relation. For Plato’s list, see F. M. Cornford, Plato’s Theory o f Knowledge (1935), 142, n. 1.
6. In his article "logos” (Encyclopedia o f Philosophy, volume 5, pp. 83-4). Kerferd has drawn attention to the
problems that attend any attempt "to trace a logical progression of meanings in the history of the word"
(logos). He notes that such attempts "are now generally acknowledged to lack any secure foundation, and even
to try to trace out the history of a single ‘logos doctrine’ in Greek philosophy is to run the rusk of searching
for a simple pattern when the truth was much more complex." The reason he gives is plain enough: the word
logos covers any of the following: word, speech, argument, explanation, doctrine, esteem, numerical
computation, measure, proportion, plea, principle and reason. One may conveniently want to add to this
intriguing list, but it should suffice to explain the complexity of the undertaking. Kerferd is correct in the case
of historical collections of uses found in different periods and thinkers. The problem I discuss in this paper
deals not with the difficulties that confront the effort to discover "a single logos doctrine" in Greek philosophy
but whether Aristotle had such a doctrine not reducible to the set of uses of the word.
7. Book II lists the following: nutrition (threptikon), appetency (orektikon), sensation (aisthëtikon), locomotion
(kmëtikon kata topon), understanding, reasoning (dianoëtikon), and nous. Orexis includes desire, (<epithymia),
thymos and boulësis. Aristotle adds that the animals that have dianoia also have logismos, implying that this
is the special case of human beings. Lowe (1993) in his otherwise interesting article discusses how κρίνειν is
used in the activities of sensation and thinking but stops short of arguing whether κρίνειν is a distinct faculty.
8. Hamlyn (1968) 121, however, thinks otherwise; he writes: "This chapter is a rambling one, but it begins and
ends with a consideration of what are fundamentally the problems of self-consciousness." A different
perspective, such as the one presented here, is reached when the chapter is read as providing support in the
form of argument for a theory of judgment that in turn provides the needed evidence that connects hinein to
legein.
9. The expression "pronounced by" in Hicks’ translation has been placed within brackets since it misleads the
reader to infer that Aristotle is referring to perceptions rather than perceptible things.
10. The passage may well be De Anima III 427b 14.
11. Associating kritika with judging, Nussbaum (1978) 334, remarks, has been defended by several scholars,
Farquarson, Forster and Louis; references to Farquharson (1912), Forster (1937) and Louis (1952). Nussbaum
argues in favor of dismissing the view that associates kritika with judging "because all these are faculties which
are involved in discriminating or making decisions. To support her position she refers the reader to a 1973
unpublished essay by J. Cooper, titled "Aristotle on the Ontology of the Senses," read at the Princeton
University Conference on Ancient Philosophy. Nussbaum understands Cooper to have "concluded from a
careful survey of the uses of κρίνειν in connection with αϊσθησις in the DA that there is no need to interpret
it as implying that any kind of explicit or reflective judgment is taking place —· and in particular that it need
not be associated with ‘explicit verbal performance or the disposition to such —as indeed we can readily infer
from his assertion of κρίνειν to animals, despite his rather low estimate of animal intelligence’." I regret not
having seen Cooper’s article.
12. Randall (1960) expresses a reservation that helps make clear why his interpretation of logos is
objectionable. "Aristotle’s conclusion may be stated: Whatever is can be expressed in words and discourse.
There is nothing that cannot be talked about, nothing wholly inaccessible to discourse, nothing ‘ineffable’. But
discourse is not its own subject matter — unless the talking is about language itself. Discourse is ‘about’
something that is not itself discourse; though what it is about —its subject matter —has a discursive or logical
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character, and that character, that intelligible structure, is just what discourse can express and state. Whatever
is can be known. There is nothing that is unknowable” (122). If this is Aristotle’s position, it would be
impossible for logos to inquire into logos, and hence impossible to arrive at a theory of logos.
13. According to Randall: "The ‘reason why’ man lives in a polis, to dioti, is that aloné of all animals man
possesses logos, the power of speech. It is significant that the same logos that makes man a ‘rational animal’
in its sense of ‘reason’ also in its sense of discourse and language, makes him a ‘political’ or social animal. For
speech serves to indicate the advantageous and the harmful, and hence also the right and the wrong. Through
speech it is man alone who has a sense of good and bad, right and wrong. And it is in partnership in these
things that makes every human association, from family to the polis." (254)
14. A key to understand the effective role of logos is given in Metaphysics 1020a4, where Aristotle states the
following: ώστε ό κύριος δρος τής πρώτης δυνάμεως αν εϊη άρχή μεταβλητική έν άλλω ή ή αλλφ. In De
Cáelo 301b 18: φύσις μεν έστιν ή έν αύτώ ύπάρχουσα κινήσεως αρχή, δύναμις δ* ή έν αλλφ ή ή αλλφ. How
does this formulation of logos qua dynamis work in the case of language? Logos "moves" language, actualizes
it, so to speak. In fact, the actualization of logos effects the refinement and perfecting of language.
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